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Abstract 
In 1999, Hydro-Quebec launched a project for the modernization of its Transmission and Distribution 
Substation Automation System (SAS). One of the fundamental requirements of the new system was to 
increase interoperability between system components in order to reduce the cost of integrating such 
components. The requirement for conformity with the IEC 61850 standard makes it possible to support this 
interoperability but is it sufficient? The standard, written by manufacturers, has to be based on flexibility 
and openness. The payload for this flexibility appears not only in terms of the complexity of the standard 
and the structure of the IED but also in terms of amplified substation engineering activities. Initially, at 
Hydro-Québec, the adoption of this standard forces the system designer to standardize the first 
applications and to some extent “close” their implementation. The main issue deals with the IED 
parameters settings. The watchword is to hide the complexity of the standard from the project designer. 
Meanwhile, at Hydro-Québec, the gradual adoption of the standard will confirm that the system designer’s 
role is more that of a system engineer, whereas the project designer will unquestionably have to assimilate 
the concepts of the standard. 
 
Résumé 
En 1999, HQ a lancé un projet de modernisation de son système de contrôle-commande (SCC) des postes 
de transport et de distribution. L’une des exigences fondamentales du nouveau système vise une 
interopérabilité accrue entre les composantes du système afin de diminuer les coûts d’intégration de telles 
composantes. L’exigence de conformité avec la norme CEI 61850 permet de soutenir cette interopérabilité 
mais est-ce suffisant ? Cette norme, conçue par les constructeurs de systèmes, se doit donc d’être flexible et 
ouverte. Ce besoin de flexibilité se paye non seulement en terme de complexité de la norme et de la 
structure des IED mais aussi en terme d’ingénierie des postes et d’organisation. Dans un premier temps, à  
Hydro-Québec, l’adoption de cette norme oblige le normalisateur à fixer les premières applications et en 
quelque sorte  à « fermer » sa mise en œuvre. Au cœur de la question : le paramétrage des IED. Le mot 
d’ordre : cacher la complexité de la norme  au configurateur. Et à moyen terme, l’adoption graduelle de la 
norme ne fera que confirmer le rôle du normalisateur comme s’apparentant à celui d’un ingénieur système 
alors que le configurateur devra  indéniablement assimiler les concepts de la norme. 
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1. BACKGROUND 
Hydro-Québec (HQ) is the state-owned utility responsible for the generation, transmission and distribution 
of electrical power in Québec. In 1999, HQ launched a project aimed at modernizing its Transmission and 
Distribution Substation Automation System (SAS) [1]. The current system consists of a distributed system 
on an Ethernet LAN with standardized layers 1-4 of the OSI model and an in-house application protocol. 
New functions are difficult to integrate. In 2002, starting with GOMSFE [2] as a basis, the project 
coordinators decided to rewrite the specifications of the new Substation Automation System (SAS) based 
on the IEC 61850 series of standards [3], which set interoperability requirements for IEDs (Intelligent 
Electronic Devices) in substations.  
With respect to real time, no special constraints, aside from compliance with the standard, have been 
defined by HQ, while a major constraint was specified for substation engineering, namely that personnel in 
charge of SAS parameterization should have no knowledge of IEC 61850 to carry out their work. In this 
paper we will use the term “interoperable IEDs” to indicate IEDs that comply with IEC 61850, and the term 
“protocol” will refer to the exchange protocol between application processes rather than to the protocols 
from layers 1.7 of the OSI model which we consider to comply with the standard.  
At HQ, the SAS engineering structure operates at two levels: the standardization level which sets fixed 
rules for all HQ substations, and the project level that tailors the system to the requirements of a specific 
substation. The HQ system designer and project designer are the personnel assigned to the two respective 
areas.  
 
 
2. INTEROPERABILITY 
Interoperability is defined in [4] as one of the six (6) subcharacteristics of functional capacity and 
comprises quality attributes in relation to the “capability of the software product to interact with one or 
more specified systems.” This definition, along with the measures of interoperability attributes defined in 
[5] and [6], may be of some use for assessing the quality of the product being developed, but is virtually of 
no use in system design. For interoperability, just like any other quality requirement, to be efficient and one 
of the elements that drives a project, it must take into account some of the characteristics of the domain. 
With respect to electrical transmission and distribution substation automation, to allow interoperable IEDs 
to be built, the IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission) created the standard [3]. In [3], 
interoperability is defined as being the “ability of two or more IEDs from the same vendor, or from different 
vendors, to exchange information and use that information for correct execution of specified functions.” 
Though still very general just like the first definition mentioned above, this definition, with the phrase 
“execution of specified functions,” adds information that may have or has a huge impact on the engineering 
of a given substation. IEDs are no longer considered as monolithic elements but as receptables for functions 
where interoperability comes into play. But the question is, what kind of function? Such a question is far 
from being trivial and its answer, by changing the level of interoperability, changes a project’s level of 
complexity. In fact, interoperability can be reduced to something quite simple (the function executed by an 
IED is “complete” and requires virtually no cooperation from other IEDs) or it can be made enormously 
complex (the function is in fact a subfunction which requires other subfunctions with their own respective 
subfunctions, and so on, to execute a significant task for the domain). The finer the granularity of the 
functions that can interoperate, the more the system will be flexible. For instance, a circuit breaker’s control 
function may be set up as several subfunctions that can be executed by more than one IED. IEC 61850 
provides for circuit breaker control being handled by one, two or three IEDs, and the choice of the number 
of IEDs is left up to substation engineering, i.e. those in charge of the system architecture. This choice 
implies that the IEDs must be capable of adapting to the architectural requirements of the customers setting 
up the subfunctions (logical nodes (LN) in the terminology used in [3]) where deemed appropriate from a 
substation management standpoint.  
This need for flexibility is obtained not only at the expense of the level of complexity of the standard and 
IED structure but also in terms of substation engineering and organizational structure. In this paper we are 
looking at engineering and structural problems.  
Interoperability often appears as a requirement from customers who wish to use several suppliers so that 
they can benefit from lower purchasing, installation and maintenance costs for their systems. However, 
when manufacturers are the ones to indicate how interoperability should be implemented, the latter is 
defined to facilitate the manufacturing of IEDs. In the case of SASs, the manufacturers’ response has been 
to become involved en masse in the drafting of the IEC 61850 series of standards where a hierarchy of 
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classes is defined which implement a set of basic functions, i.e. the LNs. In other words, the standard not 
only defines a functional core that implements the main functions of a substation and SAS, but it also 
standardizes functional extension and modifications so that it does not hinder technological developments 
and adapts to each customer’s specific requirements. Generic functions are standardized in an IED, thus 
making them less specific, with said functions requiring a relatively complex parameterization to operate. 
This approach, which is undoubtedly the most logical one from the standpoint of manufacturers at this 
stage of technological development, has impacts that are not always evident on structure and engineering at 
the customer’s end. The customer needs to parameterize IEDs in order to adapt them to substation 
operating and SAS maintenance procedures, as well as parameterize the IEDs from different manufacturers 
so that they can cooperate in the execution of functions.  
Efficient interoperability is therefore achieved by providing flexible and “open” machines that the customer 
then has to “close” and render operational through parameterization. IED parameterization is naturally not a 
new development associated with interoperability: customers have always been using parameters to adapt 
IEDs to substation characteristics. What IEC 61850 does in terms of interoperability is add more complex 
parameterization because of the specific features related to the sophistication of the logical framework 
architecture defined by the standard.  
 
3  TASK SHARING 
3.1 Introduction 
Task sharing between the system designer, project designer, and IED manufacturers is heavily influenced 
by the constraint that states that the specific features of the standard [3] may at no time make the project 
designer’s work more complicated. This constraint results from the traditional structure and efficiency of 
the engineering function at HQ, which takes into account the costs related to the training of personnel as 
well as the number of substations (transmission and distribution) involved. The idea then is to make 
transparent to the project designer the IED characteristics that pertain to the structure of the IEDs 
themselves so that the sole concern is the substation’s functionalities as seen by SAS users. “Making 
transparent” means blocking some choices that the standard makes available by decreasing the openness 
intended by manufacturers. For instance, the standard, in the modeling of the equipment part (the part that 
concerns the process), presents a substation as made up of bays and, in the modeling of application process 
communications, it stipulates that the LNs in an IED be included in logical devices (LDs). The standard 
does not stipulate anything regarding the manner in which LDs are to be structured nor does it say anything 
about the bays. These two “omissions” have a different impact on knowledge for substation engineering. 
The bay-based structure flows fairly logically from the substation structure and does not require any 
specific knowledge other than in substation automation systems. The LD structure requires knowledge in 
communications and computer systems (e.g. performance, ease of access to data). In the HQ environment, 
it is natural for the project designer to create bays, but it is not logical that he would make decisions 
regarding the creation of LDs since the concept of LDs is directly linked to the way LNs are structured 
within IEDs, which is beyond the project designer’s know-how.  
Who, then, can create LDs, given that they are an essential part of IED parameterization?  
1. The manufacturer. This solution is suitable for IEDs with set functionalities such as protection 
IEDs, but it is not feasible for IEDs with more general functions related to substation automation 
such as a bay controller involving several bays.  
2. The system designer. The standardization of fixed functions from one substation to the next led 
HQ, at least for the first version of the system, to make an automatic association between the bay 
and LD. A 1-to-1 association was therefore implemented between Bay and LD [5] that allows LDs 
to be easily created using the parameterization support program.  
However, though the choice made under point 2 to dissimulate the LD concept is fairly simple, it is much 
more difficult to dissimulate the LN concept which forms the basis for the standard. To demonstrate how 
substation engineering has been simplified by dissimulating the LNs, we will analyze the functional links 
between the IED LNs and the process. 
 
3.2 Functional link between IED and process  
The main parameterization work done by the project designer consists in “linking” the IED’s generic 
functions to the process. In this respect, three possible approaches can be considered to define the SAS 
architecture: 
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1. Add a protocol “translator”. The IEDs are connected on the LAN and communicate through a 
translator which converts the data from an IED into a format that the other IED can read and vice 
versa. This situation is widespread but is of no interest when interoperability is a central 
requirement. To talk of interoperability in such a case is to use the term incorrectly.  
2. The IEDs are connected on the LAN and exchange information in order to correctly run their 
functions. No action is required on the project designer’s part.1  This is the ideal case which should 
be strived for but it is not realistic at the current level of technology and standards since not only 
would the semantics of the application have to be formally defined but the substation management 
methods (customer’s rules) would have to be standardized outside of the company.  
3. The IEDs are connected on the LAN and must be modified so that they can interoperate. Here we 
are dealing with open interoperable systems.  
The remainder of the article will only consider the third case. The first case will not be considered since it 
is a solution that does not take into account the interoperability requirement within the actual IEDs. The 
second case will not be studied since it is of no practical interest (unless no more than one manufacturer is 
considered, which is contrary to the definition of interoperability in [3]). Neither will we consider an 
interoperability situation with no practical use for substation management even if it complies with the 
standard in every way; this is a situation where an IED responds to all messages that are not “read” only 
with a message that it cannot perform the task.  
The remaining sections of this paper will thus consider the tasks that are added to the usual ones (those 
required to set up the current substation automation system) in order to make open IEDs interoperable.  
 
3.3 Manufacturers’ tasks  
Parameterization may be delegated to manufacturers who are given substation specifications by customers. 
This is a turnkey approach but one that is not very compatible with open interoperability involving several 
manufacturers. HQ has decided to purchase the most open IEDs possible and to have the integration work 
(adaptation/parameterization) done in-house. The substation automation IEDs are therefore delivered as 
generic IEDs without any link to substation equipment.  
 
3.4 System designer’s tasks 
The HQ system designer is a pivotal figure not only because he allows standardized SASs and IEDs to be 
created but also because, as the only person with knowledge of the standard, he is responsible for defining 
everything in the standard that is not directly related to the application process.  
The system designer can be said to have two main tasks: the first consists in describing equipment and 
substations and associating them with the LNs, and the second involves all the operations required to 
ensure the standard is hidden from the project designer:  
 
1) Modeling. Consists in describing the substation LNs while taking into account the IEC’s 
requirements. Such modeling must allow rules and objects specific to HQ to be integrated [7]. 
In HQ’s case, this work led to the drafting of a specification [8] which is the main input for 
the creation of the databases.  
2) Standardizing signal names. Establish a naming convention for signals that is consistent 
with the standard while keeping the current system names so that the project designer does not 
see any changes in relation to the current system.  
3) System configurator. Define the characteristics of a system configurator that allow IEDs 
from different manufacturers to be integrated.  
4) Type of parameterization. Make a choice between what is set through off-line 
parameterization and what can be parameterized on line (the standard provides RT flexibility 
which must be limited if some IEDs are not to be made overly complex2). 
5) Standardize the IEDs. Standardize some of the IEDs that follow the modeling in item 1 such 
that the parameterization is virtually reduced to copying the data of the standardized IED. 
                                                 
1 The updating of communication addresses is not being considered; though it can be a more significant 
task than anticipated, it is still always fairly simple in relation to application process interoperability.  
2 This flexibility, however, is highly useful and even necessary when a new generic client has to be added 
who wishes to receive information from the IEDs so that it can process them in a special way that is not 
necessarily related to the substation’s basic functions.  
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6) Standardizing typical bays. Standardize certain bays (especially with respect to distribution) 
that would allow the eventual standardization of an entire substation (distribution station).  
 
4.3  Project designer’s tasks 
In theory, the project designer’s work should not change in terms of the current system’s parameterization. 
To do so, the system configurator should allow a certain number of tasks to be automated. The project 
designer’s tasks for a specific project are as follows:  
 
1) Implement the use of standardized bays and functions (LNs).  
2) Implement the use of standardized IEDs. LDs and LNs are allocated to standardized IEDs. 
3) Automatic configuration: e.g. reports, datasets, logs. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The fact that manufacturers virtually play no part in parameterization and the project designer’s role does 
not change, even if parameterization becomes much more complex, is only possible because the system 
designer’s role has changed considerably. On the one hand, new activities have been added and on the 
other, the system designer’s field of knowledge has shifted to communication and software engineering 
problems. However, without automation mechanisms, these new tasks would be too cumbersome and not 
very reliable. To facilitate the work of the system designer and consequently that of the project designer, 
we introduced a standardized objects database as a storage centre for the closing constraints that HQ 
requires from the IEDs.  
 
5  STANDARDIZED OBJECTS DATABASE (SODB)  
All of the data that describe the substation and IEDs are stored in a Configured Objects Database (CODB) 
under the project designer’s jurisdiction. This database contains the data that describe a given substation 
and that are required to prepare the XML files to be loaded into the IED configurators to parameterize the 
IEDs. The contents of the CODB originate partly from the project data and partly from a Standardized 
Objects Database (SODB). The major functions of the SODB are as follows:  
1) Set limits for the project designer’s choices regarding:  
a. Equipment specifications;  
b. Communication features.  
2) Store all enumerations of the standard to facilitate the work performed by system configurator 
applications.  
3) Establish links between process data and the data standardized by IEC 61850.  
We will show the importance of the SODB to substation engineering by considering an aspect of the third 
function.  
 
For example, the following figure shows the conceptual model that links the SODB metaclasses for the 
different types of points.  
 
tTypesPointHQ
Type : tenumTypePointHQ
Genre : tenumGenrePointHQ
Desc : NormalizedString
SCC : Boolean
Equip : Boolean
<<METACLASS>>
tTypeLN
<<METACLASS>>
tTypeData7-4
Nom : tData7-4
Description
<<METACLASS>>
tTypeEquipHQCmd
Type : tenumTypeEquipHQCmd
Description : normalizedString
<<METACLASS>>
1..* 1..*
tTypeEquipIEC
Type : tenumTypeEquipIEC
Description : NormalizedString
<<METACLASS>>
1..*
1..*
1
1..*
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Figure 1: Relationship between the different types of points 
 
tTypePointHQ defines the characteristics of the different “points” (digital inputs, analog inputs, and digital 
outputs) of the current system which are related to Hydro-Québec equipment seen from a control standpoint 
(tTypeEquipHQCmd). The types of controlled equipment are associated with the type of equipment in the 
IEC standard (tTypeEquipIEC). tTypeEquipIEC is linked to a type of LN (tTypeLN) that contains the data 
defined in the standard that are associated with the types of points in the current system.  
This conceptual model was simplified when the SODB was created by setting up a table used to create a 
direct link between the types of points in the current system with the type of LN and types of points in the 
standard.  
Table 1 – Association of HQ points with IEC points 
Name Description  Source 
TypePoint T-TypePointHQ.Type T-TypePointHQ.Type 
TypeData T-TypeEquipHQCmd.Type T-TypeDataCEI-7-4.Type 
TypeLN T-TypeLN.Type T-TypeLN.Type 
 
The above table allows the system configurator software to show the project designer the points from the 
old SAS and to automatically generate information on the new points from the standard’s point of view [3]. 
 
6 Conclusion 
To conclude, we would like to present a certain number of questions, some with tentative answers, and 
propose the modeling of links between the openness of the IEDs and the interoperability that we would like 
to expand in the future.  
 
What could be the impact of the proposed approach for distribution stations when applied to transmission 
substation automation, which is by nature more difficult to standardize?  
Would system designers be capable of managing the SODB by themselves and update not only the contents 
but the structure as well? If not, then a pivotal role would have to be given to another type of player (e.g. 
software engineer), who would only be replacing the manufacturer, who has been needlessly “removed” 
from the project.  
Is the constraint that requires that the project designer know nothing of the standard overly stringent? If so, 
then how will he be able to share management of the SODB? What part of the system designer’s work will 
he be in charge of?  
Currently at HQ, a database containing data from a facility is considered to be an engineering drawing and 
belongs to the facility operator. Is this still the case if an SODB is introduced?  
 
None of the above questions have simple answers, but what appears to us to be feasible, at the current stage 
of interoperability standardization, is that the system designer acquire more in-depth knowledge in the area 
of databases and communication and that the project designer slowly begin to learn the concepts presented 
in IEC 61850. In this way, substation engineering, which currently seems to be outside of the control of 
project designers, could once again be their responsibility and the system designer’s role could be more 
akin to that of a system engineer.  
For substation engineering not to carry any unpleasant surprises (e.g. much higher than anticipated 
parameterization and application development costs), we suggest analyzing the interactions between the 
openness of the IEDs (in short, the quantity of possible adaptations) and their interoperability.  
 
By following [5], the value of the interoperability attribute can be considered as a ratio of Y= A / B, where 
A represents the number of data formats that have been correctly exchanged with other IEDs and B is the 
total number of data formats exchanged. The ideal interoperability is therefore equivalent to 1. Openness is 
defined as a ratio of X = C/B, where C represents the number of adaptations to the data formats exchanged 
and B is the total number of data formats exchanged. The ideal openness is therefore equivalent to 0. 
Openness as defined here is proportional to the cost of parameterization.  
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The following figure shows the high-risk areas in grey. When interoperability is below a certain level, 
regardless of the openness, the system is inadequate. The same applies when openness is above a certain 
level, since parameterization costs become too high. We also considered to be inadequate an area with 
considerable openness (X tends to 0), even though the situation where interoperability is equal to 1 and 
openness is equal to 0 is ideal. It is considered as a high-risk area since the slightest change in requirements 
may considerably disrupt interoperability.  
 
Theoretically ideal 
position being discarded
Inter-
operability 
1 
Low-risk 
area 
0 
1 Openness 
 
 
Lastly, we would like to add that the fact that a system is open and adaptable to users’ changing 
requirements is not a positive feature in itself, as is too often stated. It is positive only if the cost of the 
adaptation work done by the client is lower than the price quoted by manufacturers to “close” the IEDs. But 
the tendency of clients to underestimate costs often prevents the right choice from being made. One way to 
decrease the possibility of having overly high IED closing costs is to make sure that the project designer 
has the required tools to automate part of the parameterization process. However, these tools, when they are 
very high-tech, account for a non-negligeable part of the IEDs’ development cost.  
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